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Agricultural Product Loads and Warehouse Failures

.

Norbert Delatte, M.ASCE1
Abstract: Two manufactured metal building warehouses loaded with agricultural products failed in service. Inspection revealed con
siderable damage to the structure and the foundation. The building owner ﬁled suit against the building supplier, the building erector, and
the soils testing laboratory whose engineer had designed the foundation. The agricultural product imposed substantial outward lateral
pressures on the walls of the structures. Review of the available design documents indicated that these loads had not been accounted for
in design. A structural analysis revealed that elements of the structure were underdesigned for the agricultural product loads. In addition,
the foundation did not have any slab reinforcement to resist the loads. To prevent similar failures, these loads must be accounted for in
design. The steel structure design and foundation design were both deﬁcient. A contributing factor was the lack of communication between
the designer of the structure and the designer of the foundation, due to the lack of a single engineer of record to take responsibility for the
buildings.

CE Database keywords: Structural failure; Litigation; Loads; Building design.

Introduction

Inspection

Two manufactured metal buildings were purchased and erected
for use as agricultural product storage warehouses. The product
stored was cottonseed. The cottonseed was separated from the
seed in a gin building adjacent to each warehouse, and then blown
in for storage until it could be sold. The blower loaded the ware
houses from one end, with the product removed through a door at
the other end. The warehouses were intended to be fully loaded
with the product. Once the pile of cottonseed reached the peak of
the roof, an auger built into the roof was used to move it toward
the door. The warehouse storage capability would allow the
owner to store cottonseed until it could be sold at a higher price.
The two warehouses were located in towns about 32 km (20 mi)
apart.
For two years, the warehouses were only partially loaded. Dur
ing the third season, the warehouses were loaded to the roof, and
workers outside of the building observed outward bulging of the
warehouse walls. Once the product was removed, the concrete
ﬂoor slabs were found to be badly cracked. The structure was also
damaged, with evidence of permanent deformation. Much of the
outward bulging disappeared when the cottonseed was removed,
but the distortion in the metal walls remained.
The owner ﬁled suit against the metal building manufacturer,
the erector, and the soil testing company that had prepared the
foundation design. The owner’s attorney retained the author as an
expert witness.

The author ﬁrst inspected the two warehouses in August 1999.
Both warehouses were empty. Each warehouse was 24.4 by 42.7
m (80 by 140 ft) in plan. The side warehouse walls were just over
7.26 m (23 ft 10 in.) high, with the roof rising at a 45° angle to a
peak 18.3 m (60 ft) high. One of the warehouses is shown in Fig.
1. The auger, intended to move the product from the loading end
to the door, was at the peak of the roof.
The structural conﬁguration of both warehouses was identical.
The interior framing of one of the warehouses is shown in Fig. 2.
Six gable frames are spaced at 6.1 m (20 ft) intervals. Between
the gable frames are interior soldier columns. The tops of the
interior soldier columns are restrained by steel angle bracing lead
ing back to the gable frames. Each of the pair of braces at the top
of each column has two parts, with bolts attaching them to other
parts of the structural secondary framing. The ﬁrst and last bays
have x-bracing for longitudinal stability of the structure. Each end
wall had seven columns.
These structures were purchased with an interior liner, so the
inner and outer walls of the building were separated by purlins.
Flange braces were provided to brace the side and end wall col
umns against lateral-torsional buckling and had been attached to
the inner liner panel with self-tapping screws.
The inspection of warehouse 1 revealed the following damage:
1. On the right side of the far end of the warehouse (loading
end), the top of the wall had been torn outward. This is
shown in Fig. 3. From inside the warehouse, the sky was
visible through the gap.
2. The interior liner of the wall at the far end of the warehouse
showed signs of permanent distortion (wrinkling) due to out
ward bulging.
3. A large number of the ﬂange braces on the end walls had
been torn away from the interior liner and were hanging
down. This is illustrated in Fig. 4. The cotton lint pattern in
this ﬁgure also provided an indication of how high the seed
was piled at the end wall. Some ﬂange braces along the side
walls were also torn away, as shown in Fig. 2. More ﬂange
braces were torn away lower on the walls than higher up.

Fig. 1. Exterior view of warehouse
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The concrete slab foundation was badly cracked. Cracks ran
near the bases of the side wall columns nearest to the end
wall. Cracks on the right-hand side near the end wall are
shown in Fig. 5. Cracks also ran parallel to the end wall.
Cracks were approximately 3– 6 mm (1/8 to 1/4 in.) wide.
Some cracks ran about 100 mm (4 in.) from the inner col
umn ﬂange, and some were about 1 m (3 ft) from the inner
column ﬂange.
Overall, the greatest damage was closest to the end wall. The
door ends had almost no damage.
The inspection of warehouse 2 revealed the following damage:
On the left side of the far end of the warehouse (loading
end), a brace holding back the top of an interior soldier col
umn had been torn away. This is shown in Fig. 6.
The wall at the far end of the warehouse showed signs of
permanent distortion, similar to warehouse 1.
Some ﬂange braces on the end wall and along the side walls
had been torn away, similar to warehouse 1.
The concrete slab foundation cracking in warehouse 2 was
worse than in warehouse 1. A large crack about 25 mm (1
in.) wide, shown in Fig. 7, ran parallel to the end wall. The
height differential across the crack was approximately 3 mm
(1/8 in.), with the side next to the wall lower. On the left side
wall, the three columns closest to the end wall had D-shaped
cracks around them, and a large crack ran parallel to the wall
just over 1 m (3 ft) from the wall.

Fig. 2. Warehouse interior framing

Fig. 3. Damage at eave line

5.

As in warehouse 1, the greatest damage was closest to the
end wall.
A second inspection was made in October 2000 to verify the
previous observations. At this time, some seed was stored on the
ﬂoor of warehouse 1, but the pile did not extend to the walls of
the building. The damage was no worse, but the buildings had not
been fully loaded with seed in the meantime. The need to keep the

Fig. 4. Column ﬂange braces torn away at end wall

Fig. 5. Cracking near side wall columns

Fig. 7. Cracking near end wall, warehouse 2

Review of Documents and Depositions
seed from piling up against the wall reduced the storage capacity
of the warehouses to a small fraction of the designed capacity.
Clearly, the buildings had failed and could not be used as in
tended without risk of further damage and possible collapse.

Following the initial inspection, a number of documents and
records were obtained and reviewed. Most of the project records
and reports were available. The attorneys for the plaintiff and for
the defendants obtained depositions from several dozen individu
als. The most relevant documents included the metal building
manufacturer’s records, the soil testing report used for construc
tion, the foundation design, depositions by the building erector’s
personnel, results of soil and concrete testing following the build
ing failure, and a document providing information about the ag
ricultural product loads.

Warehouse Steel Structure Designer

Fig. 6. Interior column brace torn, warehouse 2

The metal building manufacturer’s plans, shop drawings, and job
ﬁle were available for review. The design had been carried out
with computer software, following industry practices. The soft
ware used the direct stiffness method. The Metal Building Manu
facturer’s Association (MBMA) publishes a manual prescribing
loads for this type of structure, such as a snow load of 240 Pa (5
psf) and a wind load of 843 Pa (17.6 psf) based on a wind speed
of 39.3 m/s (88 mph) for the building location (MBMA 1996).
These loads were shown in the computer program output in the
job ﬁle.
However, this manual does not directly address the loads from
agricultural products. These loads were very high, as much as

6 –12 times the wind pressure. Loads due to agricultural product
were not reﬂected in the computer program output reviewed by
the writer.
The agricultural product loads were shown on one sheet of the
plans supplied to the erector and owner as horizontal reactions to
be applied to the foundation slab. This sheet showed only force
reactions and not moment reactions. A pinned base column is
often assumed for design of low-rise metal buildings (e.g., Lee
et al. 1981). Moment reactions occur at the base of a column
when it is subjected to lateral loads (and acts as a beam-column),
unless the column base is detailed to allow rotation. The impact of
this assumption on the building performance is discussed below.
The steel structure plans were supplied without a foundation
plan, except for an anchor bolt layout. In accordance with com
mon industry practice, the plans contained a disclaimer stating
that the building designer was not assuming liability for founda
tion, ﬂoor, or slab design or construction. The owner was told to
hire a foundation designer and provide him with the plans.

Soil Testing and Foundation Design
The owner hired a soil testing ﬁrm (laboratory A) for site testing
and compaction recommendations. The testing ﬁrm prepared rec
ommendations and provided ﬁeld density reports during construc
tion. Some of the testing reports prepared during construction by
this laboratory suggested higher soil moisture contents and lower
densities than the recommendations, and it is unclear from the
record whether these problems were corrected.
The owner asked the soil testing ﬁrm’s licensed engineer to
prepare a foundation plan. The drawing prepared by the testing
ﬁrm engineer provided a layout with a speciﬁcation for 27.6 MPa
(4,000 psi) concrete containing polypropylene ﬁber reinforcement
(speciﬁed by a trade name). The slab was 125 mm (5 in.) thick
with an outer turndown beam 406 by 406 mm (16 by 16 in.). A
footing 1.07 m (42 in.) square was provided under each column.
Two 15.9 mm (5/8 in.) diameter steel reinforcing bars (desig
nation 16M, US #5) were speciﬁed to be continuous around the
perimeter of the foundation in the turndown beam, with additional
bars of the same size in the footer. However, no reinforcing steel
was speciﬁed in the interior of the slab to resist the outward
horizontal reactions and moments at the column bases.
The foundation design cover letter stated that a soil support
value of 120 kPa (2,500 psf) had been used to develop the rec
ommendations. This was assumed in the writer’s analysis to be
the ultimate bearing capacity of the soil.

Building Erector
Once the foundation was prepared, a construction ﬁrm was hired
to erect the building. Adjustments had to be made during con
struction because the building was purchased with an interior
liner, which was not shown on the plans supplied by the metal
building manufacturer. The liner may be seen in Figs. 2 and 4.
The original detail for the ﬂange braces showed them bolted to
the purlins along the walls. However, with the interior liner in
place, they could not be attached directly to the purlins. There
fore, the ﬂange braces were attached with self-tapping screws
installed through the liner panel into the purlins. Furthermore,
some of the ﬂange braces were ﬁeld modiﬁed to ﬁt by ﬂame
cutting or similar methods. In some cases, little metal was left for
attachment.

Testing Laboratory Results
One of the defendants’ attorneys hired a testing laboratory (labo
ratory B) to investigate the soil and concrete slab at each ware
house. This laboratory had not been previously associated with
the project.
At warehouse 1, seven ﬁeld density tests were performed.
Densities varied from 89 to 98%. Three of the seven tests were
less than the 95% density required in laboratory A’s recommen
dations. Four ﬁeld density tests were performed at warehouse 2.
Densities ranged from 83 to 93%, and none met the speciﬁcation
prepared by laboratory A.
At warehouse 2, four concrete cores were removed. One of the
cores, taken through the nominally 125 mm (5 in.) part of the
slab, was only 111 mm (4 3/8 in.) long. The others were all taken
around the perimeter beam. The short core suggests an inadequate
thickness of the slab for at least one point, but it is not enough to
form a conclusion.
Two cores were cut to make a total of ﬁve specimens for
compression testing. Test results were 22.2, 24.1, 29.0, 29.4, and
31.9 MPa (3,221, 3,497, 4,202, 4,260, and 4,622 psi). Three
Windsor Probe tests were made on the foundation. The compres
sive strengths predicted using the Windsor Probe were 23.6, 32.8,
and 34.3 MPa (3,425, 4,750, and 4,975 psi).

Agricultural Product Loads
The owner provided the writer with a document that provided
information about cottonseed loads. He stated that a copy of this
document had been provided to the metal building designer and
other parties. The document was undated, but listed a 1987 refer
ence. He also provided a photograph of a warehouse in a neigh
boring state where the end wall had failed due to the outward
pressure of the agricultural product, and stated that he had shown
the photograph to the building designer and others.
According to the document on cottonseed loads, the bulk den
sity of cottonseed is 400 kg/m3 mass and 3.92 kN/m3 weight (25
lb/ft3) and has an angle of repose (<) of 45°. The lateral wall
pressure may be estimated using the following formula:
W P=kXDXH

(1)

where W P=lateral wall pressure; k=pressure coefﬁcient (0.20,
based on the angle of repose of 45° and rounded up); D
=density; and H=height or seed depth (Willcut et al. undated).
Therefore, with an eave height of 7.26 m (23 ft 10 in.), the pres
sure at the base of the wall was 5.75 kPa (120 lb/ft2). The pressure
increases linearly from zero at the top of the wall to a maximum
value at the bottom.
Therefore, the resultant of the pressure distribution is
F= 21 XkXDXH 2 XL

(2)

where F=resultant force; L=length of wall between columns
(3.05 m, or 10 ft); and other variables are as previously deﬁned.
The resultant force acts at 1/3 H from the bottom of the wall.
Agricultural product may be analyzed as a cohesionless soil to
determine lateral pressures. For a cohensionless soil, the active
earth pressure coefﬁcient k is

(

k=tan2 45-

<
2

)

(3)

where <=45°, as noted earlier. This gives an active pressure
coefﬁcient of 0.172, close to the value of 0.2 suggested by Willcut

et al. (undated). Eqs. (1)–(3) are the commonly used Rankine
formulas for active soil pressure, which may be obtained from a
number of soil mechanics texts, such as Dunn et al. (1980).
Therefore, along the side walls, each column has an outward
resultant force of 63.2 kN (14,200 lbs) acting 2.42 m (8 ft) from
the base of the wall. On the end walls, the outward resultant
forces are as much as 303 kN (68,000 lbs).
Since the building is loaded from one end, it is possible to
have a full load of cottonseed on the far wall, with no load against
the inside of the near wall (door end). This provides a total force
of 1,670 kN (375 kips) acting on the rear wall, at a location of
4.66 m (15.3 ft) from the base of the wall. In fact, this condition
is not only possible but also unavoidable in the course of operat
ing the warehouses as intended.

Failure Hypotheses
Five hypotheses were considered. These included steel structure
design error, construction error, foundation design error, low
strength concrete, or differential settlement. The possibility of an
extreme loading such as hurricane wind loading, earthquake, or
another similar event was considered but rejected, since there was
no evidence that such an event had occurred since the buildings
had been constructed. As mentioned above, the buildings were
some distance apart, but exhibited nearly identical distresses.
Combinations of causes were considered.

Steel Structure Design Error
Inadequate design of the steel structure by the metal building
manufacturer was considered. Supporting evidence included
structural damage that could not be readily attributed to the foun
dation failure. The suggested failure mechanism was the outward
pressure imposed by the stored cottonseed.

Construction Error
The possibility that the erector made unauthorized changes during
construction was considered. The main supporting evidence for
this hypothesis was the ﬂange brace installation that did not
match the plans or the shop drawings. The suggested failure
mechanism was also cottonseed pressure.

Foundation Design Error
Review of the documents suggested that the foundation design by
the engineer employed by laboratory A violated the applicable
American Concrete Institute (ACI 1995) design provisions and
was inadequate to resist the building column reactions. Again, the
failure mechanism would have been cottonseed pressure.

Low-Strength Concrete
The strength results noted from the core testing and Windsor
Probe observed by laboratory B were used by some of the parties
involved to suggest that the concrete delivered was of inadequate
quality. Since the foundation loads should have been resisted by
reinforcing steel to meet the code requirements, it was not clear to
the writer how this would lead to the observed failure.

Differential Settlement
Another suggested contributing factor was the low soil compac
tion results, observed by laboratory B and also suggested by the

laboratory A records, which could have led to differential settle
ment. However, since the critical forces applied were outward,
and not against the soil, this did not seem as signiﬁcant as the
other factors considered. Furthermore, the maximum vertical
loads of the building and stored cottonseed were about half the
bearing capacity assumed by the foundation designer and soil test
company (laboratory A).

Analysis
The writer analyzed the structure and foundation to determine
which of the hypotheses were most likely. This included an analy
sis of the load path and a structural analysis to determine column
forces and base moments, concrete slab foundation stresses, col
umn ﬂange brace forces, interior soldier column top brace forces,
and overall stability against unbalanced cottonseed loading.

Load Path
As part of the structural analysis, it was necessary to determine
the load path for the cottonseed lateral loads. The cottonseed
pressed outward against the inner liner of the building. In turn, the
purlins between the inner liner and the outer skin of the building
carried the loads horizontally to the columns. The forces were
transmitted from the purlins to the columns through girt clips and
the ﬂange braces. Finally, the forces were carried to the founda
tion through the columns.

Steel Column Base Moments
The writer performed a structural analysis to determine the ac
tions of individual members on the foundation slab. The structural
analysis computer program results provided by the metal building
manufacturer indicated that the structural engineer modeled the
columns as pinned at the base.
However, the pattern of damage suggested a prying action at
the base of the most heavily loaded columns. The D-shaped
cracks around some of the column bases, with cracks propagating
through the edge turndown beam, provided strong evidence of
this behavior. The column base plate detail, with bolts 305 mm
(12 in.) apart, was sufﬁcient to provide a ﬁxed base connection.
An expert witness for the metal building manufacturer suggested
that the base plate connection was a hybrid hinge, but admitted
that some moment would nevertheless be transmitted to the slab.
Also, this witness did not perform an analysis of the structure, but
had been asked only to evaluate the foundation. Therefore, he did
not attempt to calculate the magnitude of the moments.
The intermediate soldier columns, the gable frame columns,
and the end wall columns were analyzed in order to determine the
force and moment reactions transmitted to the foundation slab.
Braces at the top restrained the intermediate soldier columns.
Therefore, the amount of moment transmitted to the slab by
the column base plate depends on the amount of displacement at
the top of the column. The displacement under load was un
known, so two limiting cases were analyzed. The displacement
would be between zero with full restraint against displacement at
the top of the column, and 57.4 mm (2.26 in.) with no restraint.
Since the actual amount of restraint provided by the top braces
was difﬁcult to determine, the two limiting cases of no and full
restraint were analyzed in order to bracket the solution.
With those two limiting cases, the moment reaction applied to
the foundation slab would be between 738 and 1,840 kN-m (544
and 1,360 in.-kips) for the full restraint and no restraint cases,

respectively. The force reaction at the base of the column would
be between 50.3 kN (11,300 lbs) with full restraint and 63.2 kN
(14,200 lbs) with no restraint. These reactions were determined
using the force (or ﬂexibility) method as described by Hibbeler
(1990, 1991).
Frame analysis to determine the force reactions and moments
at the base of the gable frame columns was complicated because
the columns were tapered members. It is common in the metal
building industry to use tapered members to improve economy
(Lee et al. 1981; MBMA 1996). In this case, the gable frame
column was 864 mm (34 in.) deep at the top and 533 mm (21 in.)
deep at the base.
The gable frame column reactions were developed using the
direct stiffness method as described by Hibbeler (1990), with
modiﬁcations for tapered structural members determined by the
Portland Cement Association (PCA 1958). The frame was as
sumed to be loaded symmetrically, with cottonseed pushing out
ward against both side walls simultaneously. The analysis pre
dicted a force reaction of 29.8 kN (6,710 lbs) and a moment
reaction of 1,130 kN-m (831 in.-kips) at the column base.
End wall column reactions could be determined in the same
way as the side wall intermediate soldier columns, because these
columns were ﬁxed at the base and restrained at the top—in this
case, by the roof. However, since all of these columns were taller
than the side wall columns, the force and moment reactions would
be higher. Total force acting on the end wall is proportional to the
column height squared, as indicated by Eq. (2), so for the tallest
column at the ridge line the moment reaction would be at least
3,640 kN-m (2,600 in.-kips) and the force reaction would be at
least 241 kN (54,100 lbs), using the fully restrained case. If the
ﬂexibility of the connection at the roof were considered, the base
reactions would increase.
For determining the effect of the column reactions on the con
crete slab foundation, if the lowest force and moment reactions
exceed the available material and structural capacity, it is not
necessary to consider the larger forces. Therefore, the foundation
was analyzed for a force reaction of 50.3 kN (11,300 lbs) and a
moment reaction of 738 kN-m (544 in.-kips).

Concrete Slab Foundation
The failure of the concrete slab could have been due to three
factors:
• Inadequate concrete strength,
• Insufﬁcient slab reinforcement, and/or
• High forces imparted to the foundation.
To evaluate whether inadequate concrete strength was a con
tributing factor, the core test strength results were compared with
the ACI building code requirement. The code states in section
5.6.4.4 that core strength is adequate if the average of at least
three cores is at least 85% of the required compressive strength,
and every core is at least 75% of the required compressive
strength (ACI 1995). The core test results reported exceeded these
values. Therefore, there was no reason to suspect that the concrete
delivered did not meet the job speciﬁcation. Unfortunately, there
was no record of any cylinders made or tested on this project.
Moreover, the critical stresses imposed on the foundation were
tension imposed by column base forces and moments, not com
pression. No reinforcement was shown in the interior of the slab
to resist these forces. The ACI building code states in section
10.2.5 that the tensile strength of concrete shall be neglected in
axial and ﬂexural calculations, and thus requires steel reinforce
ment to resist tensile forces (ACI 1995). The design clearly vio

lated the code. The polypropylene ﬁbers can provide crack con
trol, but do not meet the requirement for tension reinforcement.
As the last step in the analysis of the slab, the concrete tensile
and ﬂexural stresses imposed at the column bases were consid
ered. For the 27.6 MPa (4,000 psi) compressive strength speci
ﬁed, tensile and ﬂexural strength would be approximately 4,500
kPa (650 psi) (Mindess and Young 1981). Using the lowest col
umn force and moment reactions determined earlier, the concrete
slab stress would be 7,500 kPa (1,090 psi), well in excess of
concrete strength. Therefore, the unreinforced concrete slab was
cracked by the forces and moments imposed by the steel struc
ture, bending outward from the pressure of the cottonseed.
Another foundation deﬁciency was that the 406 mm (16 in.)
edge beam was not thick enough to provide the required 635 mm
(25 in.) of embedment for the column anchor bolts. Since the
anchor bolts did not pull out, this deﬁciency does not seem to
have contributed to the failure. The expert witness retained by the
metal building manufacturer testiﬁed that the foundation was also
deﬁcient in other respects.

Column Flange Braces
Review of the structural design documents indicated that the
ﬂange braces were intended to prevent lateral-torsional buckling
of the columns. The analysis of the load path, discussed above,
noted that the cottonseed forces were transferred to the columns
through these braces as well as through the girt clips. The ﬂange
braces were more than twice as stiff as the girt clips, so they
would take carry about 2/3 of the tensile forces as the walls were
pushed outward by the cottonseed.
Therefore, an analysis was performed to determine whether
the ﬂange brace damage was due to the cottonseed loading. The
American Iron and Steel Institute (AISI 1996) provides tables that
may be used to determine the shear and pullout strength of screws
installed into cold-formed steel members. Capacities were deter
mined for a pair of #12 screws installed through the liner into a
1.9 mm (0.075 in.) thick cold-formed Z-section purlin. Assuming
higher-grade steel (448 MPa or 65 ksi), each screw capacity was
11.6 kN (2,610 lbs) in shear and 4 kN (895 lbs) in pullout tension.
The grade of steel was unknown.
The tensile forces in the lateral braces increased linearly from
the top to the bottom of each column. The bottom ﬂange attach
ments on the side walls and end walls were considerably over
stressed. The lowest brace had an axial force of 24.5 kN (5,500
lbs) and transmitted shear and tensile forces to the screw of 17.3
kN (3,890 lbs) each. Both pullout tension and shear capacities are
exceeded, without considering interaction. Use of lower strength
screws would make this deﬁciency worse.
Therefore, the pattern of damage to the ﬂange braces shown in
Figs. 2 and 4 was most probably due the outward force of the
cottonseed. Other damage mechanisms were suggested, such as
downward drag of the cottonseed or impact by forklifts. The
former would have imposed much smaller forces than the out
ward cottonseed pressure, and the latter seemed unlikely in view
of the extent and pattern of the damage.

Intermediate Soldier Column Top Brace
In each warehouse, one of the interior columns nearest the end
wall showed damage at the top. In warehouse 1, the top of a
column was shown outward, as shown in Fig. 3. In warehouse 2,
one of the braces holding in the top of a column was torn away
(Fig. 6). Analysis using both the Allowable Stress Design (ASD)

and Load and Resistance Factor Design (LRFD) provisions of the
American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC 1986, 1989) in
dicated that the connections for the braces were inadequate. Each
brace had a maximum force of 20.5 kN (4,600 lbs), but the ca
pacity at the slotted hole was only 9.3 kN (2,090 lbs). In the metal
building manufacturer’s job ﬁle, a document entitled ‘‘Correction
Warranty’’ was found for replacing the two-part brace with a
single continuous member, with a larger steel cross section. This
document suggested that at some point, the metal building manu
facturer realized that this detail was deﬁcient.

Overall Stability
The damage mechanisms discussed so far are local, leading to
distress but perhaps not the overall collapse of the structure. How
ever, differential cottonseed loading would lead to a major danger
of collapse. Moreover, the method used to load the structure guar
anteed differential loading. As the cottonseed is blown into the far
end of the building, the pile extends at a 45° angle. Thus, the far
end wall becomes fully loaded before any cottonseed reaches the
front end wall.
The total force resultant of 1,670 kN (375 kips) was resisted
by x-bracing in the end bays of the side walls. The braces for the
left side end bay may be seen in Fig. 2. A total of four sets of
braces resisted the force, and braces in compression were ne
glected in the writer’s analysis due to their slenderness.
Based on the AISC ASD provisions (AISC 1989), the required
rod brace diameter would be 89 mm (3.55 in.) for 248 MPa (36
ksi) steel and 73 mm (2.87 in.) for 379 MPa (55 ksi) steel. The
required brace diameter is much greater than that provided.

Discussion
On the basis of the analysis, the writer concluded that the steel
structure design and the foundation design were both deﬁcient.
Construction errors and inadequate soil compaction seemed to
have played little or no role in the failure.
Review of the metal building manufacturer’s plan and job ﬁle
indicated that the cottonseed forces were never accounted for in
design, although they were listed on the table of reactions for
foundation design. This was a serious omission, because the cot
tonseed forces were much higher than the forces considered in
design, and represented the controlling load case. Under the cot
tonseed loads, a number of the metal building structural elements
were overstressed and damaged, and the structure was in danger
of overall collapse. Therefore, the steel structure design was in
adequate.
The foundation design was also inadequate and violated the
ACI building code. The registered engineer who designed the
foundation slab had not previously designed a foundation. He also
missed some of the force reaction notations on the steel structure
plans. This engineer was clearly operating outside of his area of
expertise—nearly all of his recent experience had been in the
preparation of soil test reports and recommendations for labora
tory A and its clients.
A contributing factor was the practice of splitting responsibil
ity for the structure and the foundation between two engineers.
Neither took responsibility for the overall project. The metal
building manufacturer’s engineer disavowed responsibility for the
foundation and provided incomplete information on the column
base reactions. The foundation engineer misinterpreted some of
the notations that were provided. Because of the high outward
pressures imposed by the cottonseed, careful coordination of

building design and foundation design was needed to ensure sat
isfactory performance. A single engineer of record could have
prevented this failure of communication. The only common con
tact between the two engineers was the building owner.
During the writer’s original inspection, the owner led the
writer through a ﬁfty-year-old metal cottonseed storage ware
house near warehouse 1. The difference between the older build
ing and the newer buildings was striking. The structural members
were much thicker, and thick steel cables anchored the walls to
eyebolts embedded in the concrete foundation. Clearly, the out
ward forces imposed by the cottonseed had been considered in the
design of the older building. This building had given decades of
trouble-free service.

Conclusions
Stored agricultural products such as cottonseed or peanuts impose
signiﬁcant outward pressures on warehouse walls. These forces
may be predicted using standard soil mechanics equations. As
demonstrated above, calculating these pressures is straightfor
ward.
Since at least three of these warehouses have failed in the
same predictable manner, counting the building observed earlier
by the building owner, it is clearly important for designers of
future agricultural product warehouses to consider these forces in
design. It is particularly important to considered overall structural
stability under unbalanced product loads.
It is also necessary to make sure that the designer’s assump
tions about structural behavior are consistent with the detailing.
The column base connections were ﬁxed, but were modeled as if
hinged. Either a ﬁxed or hinged connection could have been used,
and the structure could have performed properly with either
detail—so long as the structure and foundation designs took the
actual connection behavior into account. Instead, the moment that
cracked the foundation slab was not accounted for by either the
structural engineer or the foundation engineer.
The practice of splitting responsibility for a structure between
a manufacturer’s structural engineer (who may know nothing
about the site conditions) and a local foundation engineer (who
may know nothing about metal building design and behavior)
presents a high risk of failure. It is particularly dangerous when
loads of the magnitudes discussed in this paper are present. A
single engineer of record is needed in order to avoid poor perfor
mance due to poor communication.
A few hours before leaving the ofﬁce to testify in the case, the
writer was informed that the case had been settled. The settlement
was conﬁdential, and the terms were not disclosed to the writer.
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